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China’s experience of industrial growth is noteworthy for several reasons, not 
least because it has made a massive use of selective industrial policies. The 
industrial development guidelines set by the Five-Year Plans are extensively 
based on the choice of “strategic” or “pillar” industries to be promoted and 
supported. What remains unclear is the way in which such industries are identified 
among many. This paper proposes a debate on how to  improve the government 
choice of strategic sectors and suggests a methodology to make this choice more 
transparent and rigorous. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology allows ranking the different industries according to their 
strategic importance in the Chinese economy. We employ an uncertainty analysis 
methodology to verify the robustness of the ranking. 
 
Findings 
The results point to a list of strategic sectors for China. Comparing the ranking of 
the strategic sectors to the list of strategic priorities described in the Twelfth Five 
Year Plan, we find that, by and large, our ranking coincides with the list of 
strategic sectors of the Chinese government. 
 
Social implications 
We argue that improving the transparency and the rigor of the choice of pillar 
industries can be crucial for the Chinese government to maintain social 
legitimization in the transition to a “market” economy. 
 
Originality 
Very little is known about the choice of strategic sectors in China in the 
international literature. By addressing the debate on the choice of pillar industries 
in China, the paper discusses a topic scarcely studied offering an unique and 
original contribute. 
 
Keywords: Policy-making, Selective Industrial Policy, Manufacturing, China, 
Uncertainty Analysis. 
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The debate over the inefficiencies and risks of selective industrial policies has 
influenced the agenda of policy actions in many ways and for a long time 
(Gainsborough et al., 2009; Altenburg, 2011). It surely has influenced the way 
governments describe their policy interventions. “Horizontal policies”, “enabling 
technologies”, “getting the fundamentals right” are all terms inherited from that 
debate. Yet, in practice countries all over the world make use of active industrial 
policies and selective or vertical incentives (Lall and Teubal, 1998). They might 
not call it selective industrial policy, but that is what it is de facto (Mazzucato, 
2013; Di Tommaso, Schweitzer 2013; Weiss, 2014; Di Tommaso and Tassinari 
2014; Tassinari, 2014). 
In this scenario, while the reasons for “government failures” have been 
extensively studied, theoretical and empirical reasoning on the ways to correct 
such failures are uncommon. The vast majority of the economic literature had 
renounced searching for remedies to government failures and supported the view 
of a minimal state. The only way to correct government failures was non-
intervention. When the crisis called for a new wave of interventionism, 
governments that needed to use, or simply wanted to use industrial policy, relied 
on old practices to select key and strategic sectors, winning firms and industries, 
priority regions and so forth. Little or no contribution came from the economic 
literature on how to deal with such choices. And, in absence of clear and rigorous 
analytical tool, such decision became often arbitrary, discretionary and guided by 
partial interests.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it wants to suggest a methodology to 
prioritize industrial sectors and to support the choice of strategic industries. Such 
methodology does not aim at finding the optimal ranking of strategic sectors for 
any country. It aims at defining a tool to make the choice of what is strategic 
transparent and rigorous by inducing governments to state explicitly their 
priorities and long-term goals. Second, we want to apply the methodology to the 
case of China. Like it or not, the second largest economy in the world does make 
use of selective industrial policies, in particular by choosing specific strategic 
sectors to be targeted by policy initiatives. This on its own should be of interest to 
any country that wishes to compete in the international market. However, little, if 
any, is known about the way such sectors are chosen by the national government. 
With this exercise we wish to give burst to that debate.  
Moreover, opening the black-box of how the sectors are chosen (priorities, targets 
and etc.) can be vital for the Chinese government itself. The transition to a 
“market” economy is posing difficult challenges to the “ruling class” that needs to 
find new ways to legitimize its intervention (Di Tommaso et al., 2013).  
We apply the proposed methodology to China’s industrial sectors and we compare 
the ranking of strategic industries to the policy guidelines included in the 12
th
 
plan. We find a great deal of overlapping between the top strategic sectors 
identified with our methodology and the definition of key industries of the 
Chinese government. We then test the robustness of the ranking and discuss the 
implications.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
government failures and selective policy intervention. Particular attention is given 
to the concept of strategic sectors. Section 3 recalls the main features of industrial 
policy in China since the beginning of the transition process, with particular 
emphasis on the recent policy guidelines of the 12
th
 Five Year Plan. Section 4 
explains the methodology to rank the Chinese industrial sectors, including the 
uncertainty analysis to confirm the robustness of the ranking. Section 5 applies 
the methodology to the manufacturing sectors of the Chinese economy and 
comments on the results. Section 6 Concludes.  
 
2. Strategic sectors and Government failures. 
 
2.1 Strategic industrial policy and rationales for targeting strategic industries 
 
The industrial policy domain has been vividly discussed in academic and policy 
making circuits. The rationales of government intervention in this field have 
traditionally focused on market failures corrections (Pigou, 1929; Bator, 1958; 
Baumol, 1965; Stiglitz, 1988, 1989), but also on other arguments as the provision 
of merit goods or the need of governing industrial development with strategic-
economic purposes (Amsden 1989; 1994; 2003; Chang, 1994; 2002a; 2002b; 
Rodrik, 2008; Di Tommaso and Schweitzer, 2005; 2013; Stiglitz, 2001; Stiglitz 
and Lin, 2013). 
We in particular focus our analysis on the latter field of intervention, that we 
identify as 'strategic industrial policy'. In this specific case, the rationale is that 
policy makers can have a role in guiding a country, much as entrepreneurs and 
managers do in the case of companies. Government responsibility may be viewed 
as defining strategies in the name of national interest and citizens’ welfare. 
In many established industrialized countries it is possible to find a debate about 
the role that government might play in defining and implementing the national 
strategy for industrial development. In all the industrial development experiences 
of the most successful countries governments have identified a set of goals that 
have been defined to be strategic for their economies and more generally for their 
countries (Chang, 2002b). Examples of these strategic goals are improvements in 
competiveness, acceleration of growth, structural adjustments, industrial 
development, industrial and economic “independence,” export promotion and 
import substitution, innovation and technological upgrading, the definition of 
measures to contrast industrial decline or crises and recessions. 
In most circumstances these goals are promoted through selective (or vertical) 
industrial policies, by targeting selected companies, regions and territories, or 
specific industries (Lall and Teubal, 1998; Chang et al., 2013). Thus, 'targeting' 
can be consider the most traditional (and debated) feature of industrial policy.   
Generally, the existing literature in this field has defined strategic sectors 
according to their ability to promote economic growth. Thus, competitiveness has 
been a first objective to evaluate how strategic a sector is. This perspective in 
defining strategic sectors has been recently supported also by Justin Lin, the 
World Bank’s Chief Economist from 2008 to 2012. Consistent with the idea that 
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different industries have different growth potential, the government should 
promote the structural adjustment of the economy by fostering the development of 
the technical and organisational capacities of enterprises operating in sectors with 
'latent comparative advantages' (Lin, 2010, 2012; Lin and Chang, 2009). In 
general terms, having identified competitiveness as the relevant aspect of the 
strategic significance of a sector has made the academic debate focus on ‘more 
dynamic’ industries, which are capable of developing important economies of 
scale through learning by doing, characterised by high technological and capital 
content, high value added, and which are capable of gaining the highest profits 
and export performances (Krugman, 1987; Michalski, 1991; Soete, 1991; Stevens, 
1991; Teece, 1991; Yoshitomi, 1991). 
In addition to competitiveness, another important criterion that literature has used 
to identify industries with a strategic potential is the level of interdependence 
between different economic activities. As described by several authors, a sector 
can be considered as strategic because produces positive externalities, having a 
high degree of upstream and downstream connections with other sectors 
(Hirschman, 1958; Krugman, 1987; Michalski, 1991; Soete, 1991; Stevens, 1991; 
Teece, 1991; Chang et al., 2013; Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2014). 
In other cases, the industrial policy practices common to many governments 
throughout history show how some sectors can be considered as strategic because 
of their weight in the economy, calling for a deep reorganisation of traditional and 
old industries. The relevance of the sector in terms of, for example, how much 
employment it creates, which is a crucial aspect of the wellbeing of a community, 
can per se give particular importance to an industry. This aspect is often 
associated with sectors that have been part of a society for a long time, have 
accumulated know-how, specific human capital, supply networks, and a 
reputation, so that transition to other sectors would be too costly from an 
economic and social point of view (See, e.g., Chang, 2003; Whitford, 2005). 
Finally, another kind of literature suggests that strategic sectors can (or should) be 
identified by going beyond purely economic criteria and referring to the doings 
and beings of a society as a whole. In fact in many cases industrial policy has 
been called on to intervene to address issues of distribution of wealth among 
people or regions, access to merit goods, social or environmental sustainability 
and even foreign policy goals. In this perspective the processes of development 
and change of a country is evaluated going beyond the traditional variables of 
growth and economic performance (Sen, 1983, 1999; Arndt, 1987; Hirschman, 
1981; Ingham, 1993; UNDP, 1990). When adopting this approach, overnments 
might be called on to intervene in some specific industries even at the cost of 
economic efficiency (Musgrave, 1959; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984; Chang, 
1994; Ver Eecke, 2007). For example, government might encourage the 
production of education, research, energy, health care, or environmental 
protection industries. On the other hand, governments might be called upon to 
discourage the production of those goods and services that are deemed non-
meritorious and perhaps over-provided, such as cigarettes, alcohol, gambling, and 
sales of weapons. 
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As shown by this literature review, the criteria for targeting particular industries 
could be numerous and controversial. And this is why we will argue that 
industrial policy should depend on the transparent definition of value-based 
societal goals. 
  
2.2 Selective industrial policy and government failures: international debate 
and the case of China 
 
In spite of the wide range of justifications for a strategic industrial policy, the 
commo  critique in this field has often been the one of considering government 
intervention as destined to failures (Wolf, 1989; Krueger, 1990; Le Grand, 1991; 
Chang, 1994; Lerner, 2009; Di Tommaso and Schweitzer, 2013; Schuck, 2014). A 
widespread literature has criticized the capacity of governments to intervene in the 
industry’s dynamics. In some selected circumstances industrial policy can be 
considered crucial or legitimate, but in the end it has to be discouraged because 
government interventions are assumed to be inefficient and ineffective. The 
traditional government failures literature argument in this field points out that it is 
possible that the consequences of policy failures may be worse than the benefit of 
the intervention. Indeed, public institutions can fail to achieve their objectives for 
several reasons, or can divert them from true public interests to partial ones. 
In particular, the specific case of selective industrial policies raises a risk of 
government failures particularly high regarding to the mechanism through which 
politics defines industrial policy goals, targets, and tools. The political arena is 
where various interests interact and c ntribute to the definition of general and 
specific policy goals. Different groups have different weight and capacity to 
express their demand for policy. Using Hirschman’s powerful concepts, different 
social segments have different capacity to express their “voice” (Hirschman, 
1970). These differences in influence interfere with the politically-driven activity 
of defining public interest goals. In this perspective industrial policy could fail 
because, in defining what societal goals are to be pursued, some partial interests 
might be too influential. In general governments tend to be too vulnerable to the 
pressure of “partial” interests and this is why industrial history (up to the present 
time) contains many examples of policies targeting specific industries, regions 
and companies where the linkages with wider societal goals have been vague and 
weak (Di Tommaso and Schweitzer 2013). This happens also because 
governments tend to be vulnerable to what well-organized special interests can 
offer. They might fail to define goals (and also fail to select targets and tools with 
adequate caution) because they see the opportunity of exchanging consensus (and 
political support) for their “special attention”. Thus, industrial policy might fail 
because it is a very powerful instrument in the hand of politicians seeking to 
maximize the chances of winning the next election or maintaining power in other 
ways. In this scenario, the industrial policy debate, involving support and 
strategies for industries, regions and companies, become one of the most 
interesting fields of negotiation between politicians and groups of individuals with 
highly organized, narrow, economic interests, inducing a gradual shift from a 
“profit-seeking” society to a far less efficient 'rent-seeking' society (Buchanan J., 
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Tollison R., Tullock G., 1980; Tollison R., 1982; Di Tommaso and Schweitzer, 
2013). And the negotiation between “rent-suppliers” and “rent-demanders,” the 
exchange between political consensus and policies in favour of specific industries, 
regions and companies may even further deteriorate encouraging practices of 
favouritism, nepotism and corruption.  
Notwithstanding the differences in the political systems, China and western 
economies share the possible scenario of a government that fails to act in favour 
of the public interest, because captured by partial stances. Government failure is a 
potential threat in China, as it is anywhere else. According to the pessimist view 
the true threat to Chinese economy and society lies in the existence and 
pervasiveness of its government failures (Gong, 2014; Gillboy, Read 2008). 
Solving these could be a crucial part of maintaining the Chinese capitalism alive 
in the long run. Evidence suggest that government failure is a central issue in 
contemporary China. 
First of all, lobbying exists in China, as it is documented by the specialized 
literature (Kennedy, 2009; Deng and Kennedy, 2010; Rugman et al., 2014; Unger 
and Chan, 2015). Even though the Chinese political system is not governed by the 
electoral mechanism, it has been argued that other mechanisms, other than votes - 
and not necessarily involving corruption - can make governments responsive to 
outside influence (Kennedy, 2009). There are reasons for businesses to lobby the 
Chinese government and for the government to be willing to listen. In particular, 
the Chinese government needs information and commitment by businesses to 
make public policies effective and to achieve its long-term goals. Fast economic 
growth, as well as other goals such as a rapid shift to environment friendly 
productions or higher value added activities, cannot be achieved without the 
collaboration of firms.  And in the end the ability of the Chinese government to 
maintain its legitimization, avoiding social unrest, rests on its capacity to achieve 
such goals.   
Second, the government perceives government failures as a serious issue, and this  
is itself a sign that the threats of regulatory capture or widespread rent-seeking are 
concrete. The recent anti-corruption campaigns, both at the national and local 
level, show that the problem of extreme self-seeking bureaucrat is particularly 
widespread, as also suggested by some specialized literature (Dong and Torgler, 
2013; Liu and Liu, 2017). Such campaigns also highlight another important 
aspect: the party is increasingly forced to build its legitimization on the 
“management of integrity” (Gong, 2014). Defeating extreme government failures 
becomes the ultimate challenge of the Chinese political system (Fan, 2006; 
Naughton, 2005; He, 2014). 
In this scenario the focus on all the remedies that are directed to mitigate potential 
government failures is a crucial part of highly demanded (and opposed) industrial 
policy programs of the present and of the future. Therefore, theoretical and 
empirical reasoning must keep the pace with the interventionist practices. In other 
words, the debate on industrial policy has to include new rigorous discussions 
about possible remedies to government failures, in China as well as in other 
countries. Otherwise we are destined to see the same old failures of the past. 
Page 6 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem

































































In particular, while a lot of discretional reasons might justify the favour of the 
government toward particular industries, we argue that the definition of the 
specific targets and goals has to rely on methodologies able to increase 
transparency, effectiveness and participation to the policy-making processes. In 
this perspective, this paper aims to propose a methodology to increase rigor and 
transparency in the identification of strategic sectors. 
 
 
3. Selective Industrial Policy in China 
 
With the open-door policy China has decided to gradually open most of its 
economic transactions to the international market and to remove the planning 
mechanism. However, what is now clear is that such opening has been taking 
place in a gradual way, with different sectors being liberalized to a different 
degree and at different times. Moreover, even when the shift towards a free 
market economy seemingly has taken place, it can be argued that it has led to a 
capitalism with Chinese characteristics, where governments maintain an active 
role in pursuing strategic objectives (Yang and Stoltenberg, 2014; Lv and 
Spigarelli, 2016). In particular the metavision of the leadership is a crucial 
element to understand the control over specific state firms, the promotion of 
national champions and the focus on long term social and distributive goals. This 
has led to an idea of the market for strategic sectors that allows the emergence of 
few state actors and limits de facto the competition (Pearson, 2005).  
The strategic sector approach is dominant throughout the transition process. Since 
the 80s the Chinese government has always kept strict control on what was 
considered strategic in specific phases of the transition. When trade and 
investment were firstly and gradually liberalized, specific conditions were 
imposed to foreign investors, and investment in specific sectors was privileged 
(Di Tommaso et al., 2013).  Other areas of the economy, such as capital flows, 
were maintained strictly under the control of the central government and did not 
experience any liberalization up to date. In a second phase, state-owned 
enterprises were  reformed and “privatized”. However, strict control was 
maintained on the majority of shares of those companies considered “strategic” 
(Rubini and Barbieri, 2013). Examples include for instance the automobile 
industry and the energy-related sectors where national state-owned champions 
were nurtured to be the leading actors of those sectors.   
Policies specifically aimed at supporting the industrial development have always 
followed a strategic sector approach. This can be seen both in the definition of the 
policy objectives and in the specific tools used to promote industrial growth. 
Long-term policy goals are defined within the Five Year Plans, which have been 
the main programming tool of the Chinese governments since the 1950s. And 
even though they now aim at providing guidelines, rather than defining binding 
targets, five-year plans always give precise indications on the industries that are to 
be considered strategic. They are either defined as “pillar” industries or “key” 
industries, together with  “strategic emerging sectors”. Even when such 
definitions are not explicitly written, one can identify in the plans the paragraphs 
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and indications specifically directed to selected sectors. Often the identification of 
what is strategic goes as far as to the detection of specific sub-sectors or products 
to be promoted (as in the case of the 12th Five Year Plan, Tab 1.). The 
identification of strategic sectors in the five-year plans goes hand in hand with the 
catalogues of the MOFCOM that identify permitted, encouraged, restricted and 
prohibited investment projects (Davies, 2013). Table 1 summarizes the main 
strategic sectors identified in the last four Five-year Plans.  
As it is clear from the comparison of the four Plans, some major strategic 
industries (pillar) have remained fixed. In particular machinery, electronics 
automotive, petrochemicals and construction/building materials are always in the 
list of key industries. Then in recent Plans new sectors have been identified, 
namely shipbuilding, metallurgical industry and packaging. The identification of 
these industries is often accompanied by indications on the actions to be taken, 
either in terms of production and growth targets or in terms of quality 
improvements to be promoted. 
Next to the pillar industries the Plans normally identify a list of emerging sectors, 









The guidelines of the Five Year Plans have been implemented through several 
policy tools. The first important one has been that of experimenting by means of 
Special Economic Zones. Throughout the transition process the national and 
provincial governments have been “experimenting” initial changes within 
bounded areas and then expanding the reforms if the results were satisfactory. 
Even nowadays Special Economic Zones are used as “laboratories” to observe 
new production mechanisms, while maintaining the ability to control and govern 
the change (Yao e Whalley, 2015). There are several types of economic zones in 
China, each one with its specific aim and each one promoting specific industries. 
Economic and Technology Development Zones are mainly directed at promoting 
growth in traditional strategic industries. High Tech Development Zones focus on 
the promotion of investment in high value added sectors. Export Processing Zones 
and Free Trade Zones are particularly aimed at promoting international trade. 
Most zones specifically identify encouraged industries (HKTDC, 2015, 
www.hktdc.org). Beyond special economic zones other tools have been used to 
promote industrial growth, with special attention to the sectoral component of 
industrial development. Among these tools is the promotion of specialized 
industrial clusters (Bellandi e Di Tommaso, 2005; Barbieri et al., 2009; Rubini et 
al, 2015), the use of public procurement policies (USCBS, 2011), the 
implementation of mega-prjects and the management of SOEs (Rubini and 
Barbieri, 2013) and etc. 
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There is little doubt that selective industrial policies, also by means of 
identification of strategic sectors, have been a pillar of the Chinese economic 
policy. However, very little is known about the processes that govern the choices 
made by the central (and local) governments. How does the Chinese government 
choose what is strategic? How are strategic sectors defined? Very little is known 
about the choice of strategic sectors in China in the international literature. A 
great deal of the Plans’ content is formulated by the Development and Reform 
Commission (Ahrens, 2013) and there is no official document entering in the 
process of choosing what the strategic sectors are. Indubitably, the existing 
western literature is mainly focused on the mere description of the sectors as they 
appear in the plan.  
Even in China little is known on the choice of sectors, although a recent debate is 
growing among Chinese scholars regarding the pros and cons of identifying 
strategic sectors at the national level. Some criticism is emerging on the failures 
of such choices. In particular there is an issue of sector convergence in policy 
support across the different Chinese provinces, that creates duplication and waste 
of resources, as well as excessive competition (Guo et al., 2013). There is an 
academic debate on how to make a better choice (Guo et al., 2013; Guo e Hiu, 
2012). However, in our perception, this debate aims at substituting for the 
political decision of what is strategic, with algorithms able to find a “fit-for-all” 
solution.  
In the methodology we propose in this paper, we stress that no “best solution” is 
to be found in the use of statistical tool. But rather that the statistical tool should 
force governments to define its objectives explicitly, to state clearly the relative 
importance placed on different aspects (e.g. employment, growth, productivity, 
environment etc.), and finally to test the robustness of the ranking of strategic 




The first part of our methodology we present in this paper is focused on the 
computation of composite indicators. Composite indicators (or summary indices) 
have been constructed first by sociologists with the aim at comparing social units 
like cities and nations with respect to multiple dimensions of social life. 
Composite indicators are very familiar in country performance comparison in 
globalization, competitiveness, education, health, human rights, ecological 
footprint, corruption, technology achievement, social cohesion and trust in public 
institutions (Fayers and Hand 2002, Arboretti et al. 2007, OECD 2008, Bonnini et 
al. 2009). Other fields where composite indicators have been successfully used 
are: quality assessment of industrial products, quality of work and customer 
satisfaction (Marozzi 2009). 
The main intuition of this paper is to apply the notion of composite indicator to 
build a coherent methodology to define the strategic sectors of an economy. A 
rather general framework to compute composite indicators is reported in Marozzi 
(2014b). Here, we modify this framework to rank the J=28 Chinese 
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manufacturing industries on the base of X1,.., XK, K=5 variables that describe the 
strategic significance of the sectors. 
The procedure to design the Strategic Sector Index is based on two steps: 
1. normalisation 
2. weighting and aggregation. 
In the first step of the procedure, the variables are normalised. Let Xjk denote the 




corresponding to well-known linear scaling in the min-max range. Note that, to 
avoid β(Xjk) values equal to 0 or 1, which may cause computational 
inconsistencies in the aggregation step, correction factors 1/J and 2/J are added 
respectively to the numerator and denominator. Note that before performing the 
aggregation-weighting step, the variables should be normalized because they have 
different scales and dispersions. 
 In the second step of the procedure, the normalized data are weighted and 
aggregated to obtain the SSI value for sector j (j=1,...,J). In general, the SSI may 
be defined as 
 
, c=1,…,C, d=1,…,D 
 
where δc denotes the aggregation rule and dwk the weight assigned to the k-th sub-
indicator according to a certain weighting scheme. In general, we may select the 
aggregation rule among C different rules, and the weighting scheme among D 
different schemes. In particular, we may consider the following four aggregation 
rules 
 








• c=3, Logistic rule 
 











( )( ) jdckdjkdc KkwX ψβδ == ,...,1,,
( )( ) ( ) jdKk kdjkkdjkd wXKkwX ψββδ 111 ,...,1,, === ∑ =
( )( ) ( )( ) jdKk kdjkkdjkd wXKkwX ψββδ 212 1log,...,1,, =−−== ∑ =
Page 10 of 24
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem







































































where Φ-1 denotes the quantile function of a standard normal distribution (see 
Arboretti et al., 2007, and Bonnini et al., 2009, for a deeper discussion on 
normalisation and aggregation functions). 
The design of the SSI involves subjective decisions on which aggregation method 
and weighting scheme select. Each selection of (c,d) has its pros and cons, and 
leads to a different SSI and then potentially to a different ranking of sectors from 
the most to the least strategic one. As emphasized by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008) it is mandatory to assess 
the robustness of SSI ranking against its design. As suggested among others by 
Saisana et al. (2005), Marozzi (2014a), Luzzati and Gucciardi (2015), and Di 
Tommaso et al. (2017), this question is addressed by performing uncertainty 
analysis. 
Uncertainty analysis is a Monte Carlo simulation-based procedure applied to the 





Uncertainty analysis aims at testing whether the ranking of manufacturing sectors 
according to their different ability to promote the economic growth is robust or 
volatile with respect to the design of the index. More precisely, the aggregation 
source of uncertainty is modelled by scalar input factor U1 and the weighting 
source of uncertainty is modelled by vectorial input factor U2. According to 
general practice, uniform distributions are assigned to the input factors (Saisana et 
al. 2005). These distributions are sampled, ie aggregation and weighting are 
varied simultaneously to assess their effects on the SSI. 
 
 
Let ε denote a continuous random variable uniformly distributed in the [0,1] 
interval. For input factor U1 the general disposal rule is 
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Input factor U2=(U21,...,U2K) is the vector of raw weights. We assign to each raw 
weight a continuous uniform distribution in the interval [p,q] with 0<p<q. 







































with ω>1, where for example ω=3 (the value used in the next Section) means that 
the maximum theoretical normalised weight cannot exceed three times the 










The rationale for assigning different weights to the variables is to reflect different 
importance as well as different perceptions of policy makers towards them.  
The uncertainty input space is sampled L times, ie L combinations of the two 
sources of uncertainty are generated. Each combination corresponds to a different 
SSI: lψ=(lψj,j=1,…,J) and then to a different ranking of the J sectors. Let 
lR=(lRj,j=1,...,J) be the rank vector. Considering all L combinations of input 
factors we obtain for sector j a vector of L ranks jR=(lRj,l=1,...,L), j=1,…,J which 
is an estimate of the uncertainty distribution of the rank of sector j. The median of 
jR is a summary measure of sector j rank uncertainty distribution and the interval 




 percentiles of the rank distribution reflects the 
robustness of it with respect to the design of the composite indicator. A wide 
uncertainty interval for sector j means that its ranking is volatile because it 
markedly depends on the selection of a particular aggregation method and a 
particular set of weights. Conversely, a narrow interval means that sector j 
ranking is robust because it slightly depends on the particular design of the SSI. 
 
5. Application to Chinese industry 
 
The strategic importance of a sector is a complex phenomenon to measure, since 
it depends on several aspects. By applying the methodology described in the 
previous section, we construct a composite indicator - the Strategic Sector Index 
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As previously noted, there are several criteria that can potentially justify the 
promotion of particular industries. Therefore a clear specification of the policy 
priorities is necessary in order to assess the strategic importance of the sectors. 
In this application we assume that the Chinese “economic growth” is the main 
policy objective that the government wants to achieve. We do so because 
promoting economic growth has been a constant commitment of Chinese 





plan in particular, the government has declared other strategic objectives (among 
which indigenous innovation, environmental sustainability and reduction of 
income disparities), in addition to economic growth (Yip and McKern, 2014; Guo 
et al., 2016). However, these new objectives are not to be achieved at the costs of 
a lower income growth: promoting sustained economic growth remains at the 
centre of the policy action. The recent lowering of target growth rates has to be 
considered an inevitable consequence of the economic crisis, rather than evidence 
that fast economic growth is no longer a priority in the policy agenda. Given this 
specific goal, we focus our analysis on manufacturing industries, because of the 
special role that they play in the dynamics of economic growth.1 
 
The Strategic Sector Index (SSI) is used for studying the Chinese manufacturing 
system with particular regard to the years of the international crisis. The data, 
provided by China Statistical Yearbook 2012 and 2008, are related to 28 
manufacturing industries. 
The five variables used to construct the index - which are in the end the criteria 
we use to define a strategic industry – capture both the relevance of the sectors in 
static terms and the sector performance in a dynamic perspective. It is important 
to stress here that, when we conclude that a specific sector is “strategic” we are 
not claiming that it should be supported nor we identify specific tools to support 
it. We just highlight that, given its weight in the economy and its growth 
performances, it likely deserves particular attention by the government.  
 
The variables that compose the SSI are: 
 
1. Employment (%) (2011): measured as the sector’s employment as a 
percentage of the total employment. The higher the capacity of a sector to 
generate jobs, the more strategic that industry, not merely from an economic point 
of view, but also from a social and political perspective; 
 
2. Output Growth (2007 - 2011): measured as the growth of the sector’s 
industrial output from 2007 to 2011. It aims at capturing how the sector has 
evolved during the crisis. 
 
                                                        
1 In fact, according to several authors manufacturing plays a central role in the dynamics of growth 
thanks to features such as high labour productivity, economies of scale, positive externalities, 
frequent technological change, and innovation (see, for example, Tregenna, 2009, 2014; Chang et 
al., 2013). 
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3. Fixed assets Growth (2007 - 2011): measured as the growth in the value of 
a sector’s fixed assets from 2007 to 2011. It aims at measuring the capital 
intensity and the propensity of private businesses to invest in the sector. 
 
4. Total profits Growth (2007 - 2011): the sector’s growth of profits wants to 
approximate the ability to attract new entrants in the future and generate new 
investment.  
 
5. Value added tax payable Growth (2007- 2011): the sector’s growth in 
value added from 2007 to 2011 approximates the presence of high technologies 
and knowledge content in the production processes. Together with profits it 
captures the ability of a sector to generate income in the years of the economic 
crisis. 
 
Summarizing, according to these variables strategic sectors are those with a 
remarkable and growing weight in the manufacturing system in terms of 
employment, with growing industrial output, capital intensity, profits, and value 
added.  
Before building the index we have calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between all the different possible pairs of variables, in order to assess the degree 
of correlation. When building composite indicators it is important that the 
variables display a positive correlation, a negative correlation between the 
variables would in fact imply that there are trade-offs between the criteria that we 
have defined. As shown by the Pearson coefficient matrix below, the chosen 








After normalization of the five variables, in order to assess the robustness of the 
SSI ranking, we perform the uncertainty analysis presented in the previous 
section. The following graph summarises the result of the uncertainty analysis 
computed, considering L=20000 different combinations of input factors – 
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The graph shows the ranking of strategic industries according to the SSI for 
Chinese manufacturing (where sector 1 is the best and sector 28 the worst for 
strategic importance). 
 
By applying the uncertainty analysis, for each sector we obtain a distribution of 
values of the SSI that are transformed in the corresponding ranks. Therefore the 
position of each sector is not given by a single value but by a distribution of 
values corresponding to a large number of different combinations of inputs in the 
index equation. This is graphically represented by an uncertainty interval (bands) 
for each rank (position). In particular, the ranking is built on the basis of the 
median rank for each sector, which is represented in the graph by the dot, whereas 
the band goes from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the rank uncertainty 
distribution. The median can be considered reasonably independent with respect 
to the computing assumptions of the index (see Section 4). The wider the band, 
the higher the influence of index computing choices (i.e. selection of combining 
function and of the weights assigned to the variables) on the ranking. In other 
words, the wider the bands, the less sure the result of the ranking for that specific 
sectors: by changing weights to the single variables or by changing the combining 
function, the position of the sector in the ordering of strategic sectors can vary 
significantly. 
When this is the case, the discretional power of the policy maker and the 
possibility of manipulating the ranking are higher. In practice, by giving more 
importance to profits or to employment, or by changing the way the different 
criteria are put together the policy maker could easily push up in the rank the 
sectors he or she cares about. While this is not necessarily a bad thing – it might 
be legitimate for a government to give more importance, for instance, to value 
added or employment and to act accordingly - it can give space to government 
failures when the policy priorities are not set and communicated in a transparent 
way to the public. 
The SSI and the uncertainty analysis provide a powerful tool to both inform the 
government and to watch the government. When bands are very narrow it means 
that a sector unambiguously contributes – much or little, depending on its position 
- to all the priorities specified in the indicator. On the other hand, when bands are 
very large, the contribution is more ambiguous.  
In the specific case of China, the uncertainty analysis shows that the SSI based 
ranking of industries is sufficiently robust. In fact, the bands tend to be generally 
narrow (with some exceptions). As it can be noted, industries near to the head and 
to the tail of the ranking have generally shorter bands, and results tend to be more 
robust for these sectors. In certain cases the median is located at the extremity of 
the band because its value coincides with the maximum or minimum of the range, 
this is another indication of the robustness of the median ranking. 
At a general level, the analysis shows a different capacity of economic sectors to 
promote the growth of the Chinese economy, providing a ranking of strategic 
industries. 
In the top ten positions we find: transport equipments, chemicals, computers and 
electronics, smelting and processing of ferrous metals, non-metallic mineral 
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products, machinery (general and special purpose and electric), textiles. The only 
sectors with relatively large bands is smelting and processing of ferrous metals, 
whose band however remain always within the first ten positions. The other top 
ten sectors show a very robust positioning. It is interesting to note that, with the 
only exception of chemicals, all of the top ten sectors of our ranking are included 





This result is coherent with our assumption that strategic sectors in China are 
being defined by their ability to generate economic growth. However, further 
research is needed to verify also how well this ranking would fit different and 
more recent policy objectives (for example environmental sustainability). In the 
list of key industries identified by the Chinese government petrochemicals has 
always been present, since 1996. Our ranking suggests that its contribution is not 
so clear-cut. It enters the first 10 positions only in some simulations, according to 
the specific weight and combining function used to compute the index.  
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In China as well as in many other countries the choice of strategic sectors does not 
seem supported by a transparent debate on what defines how strategic an industry 
is. By and large the choice of strategic sectors seems to be taken for granted: some 
sectors are simply assumed to be strategic. But the specific political priorities that 
respond to a country’s definition of strategic sectors are not openly debated and 
too often there is no scientific validation of the relationship between specific 
political priorities and the definition of strategic sectors. Nor do we see any 
attempt to test the robustness of the choices that identify the list of a country’s 
strategic sectors.   
Before the financial crisis, the economic literature had largely abandoned the 
debate over strategic sectors, in the belief that horizontal policies could be more 
effective than sectoral ones. However, in recent time a new interest has emerged 
over the definition of strategic sectors. This interest goes hand in hand with the 
renaissance of industrial policy called by the economic crisis.    
In the present paper we offer a methodology to support the choice of strategic 
sectors. The methodology has two main advantages. First, it is built on the 
construction of a simple composite indicator (SSI) that includes the variables 
defining the political priorities that a country wishes to promote when choosing its 
strategic sectors. In this sense, the methodology can be used by governments as an 
easy way to communicate to the public their strategic priorities (e.g. employment, 
investment, value added, environment and so forth). Moreover, by applying such 
methodology governments are forced to clarify - to themselves and to the public - 
the relative importance they apply to each political priority. Second, the 
methodology employs an uncertainty analysis to verify the robustness of the 
ranking of strategic sectors. This aspect is crucial. The uncertainty analysis allows 
distinguishing the sectors that undoubtedly contribute to all the strategic priorities 
                                                        
2
 Equipment manufacturing, automotive, shipbuilding are classified as transport equipment by the NBS 
(2014), packaging is classified as special purpose machinery. 
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- irrespectively of the relative weights assigned and the specific combining 
function used to calculate the SSI - from those whose contribution is more partial 
or ambiguous. In this latter case the discretion of government to push specific 
sectors is higher and potentially more vulnerable to government failures. By 
verifying the ranking of strategic sectors, the government, as well as the public, 
are better informed on the choice of strategic sectors. Moreover, by 
communicating the robustness of its choice, by increasing the transparency in this 
sense, the government is less vulnerable to potential capture by partial stances not 
representing the public interest.  
In this work, the uncertainty analysis has been applied to a case-study deliberately 
circumscribed and simplified. No need to recall here the reasons that make China 
more than just one case-study. Studying China is vital to understand the 
international contemporary manufacturing (Di Tommaso et al., 2013).  
In our exercise, we have narrowed the range of the possible policy priorities to 
promotion of economic growth and we have applied the methodology to the 
manufacturing sector. Of course we are conscious that there are many other 
political priorities that could be analysed beyond economic growth, and to which 
the identified pillar industries might de facto contribute. This is left for future 
research, what here we want to stress is the need to discuss and develop tools able 
to enter the complex process of choice of strategic sectors. By making the linkage 
between declared social goals and choice of strategic sectors more transparent, we 
believe we can offer support to effective industrial policies, in China and 
elsewhere. From this point of view, one of the main strengths of the analysis is the 
clear evaluation of the robustness of the ranking obtained from our composite 
indicator, and, consequently, the possibility for policy-makers to discretionally 
condition the result. Our results suggest for China that the ranking of strategic 
sectors is sufficiently robust and overlaps by and large the choice of strategic 
sectors of the 12
th
 Year Plan. In other words, the definition of pillar industries of 
the Chinese government appears coherent with the priority goal of promoting 
economic growth. Further research, as said, could be done with the same 
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Table 1. Pillar Industries and Emerging strategic sectors. Five Year Plans (1996-2015) 









Food      
Drinks     
Tobacco     
Textiles P P P  
Wearing Apparels     
Leather     
Wood     
Furnitures     
Paper making      
Printing      
Sports and culture products     
Petroleum, coke and nuclear f. P  P P 
Petro-chemicals P  P P 
Nuclear fuels  E    
Chemicals    P  
Medicines and Pharmaceuticals      
Biotech  E E E E 
Traditional Chinese Medicine   E E 
Rubber     
Plastics     
Non mineral metals P P P P 
Smelting of ferrous materials    P P 
Metal products      
General purpose machinery  P    
Special purpose machinery  P P P 
Packaging     P 
Meccatronics  P   
Transport veichles and equip. P P   
Automobiles  P P P P 
Ecological vehicles     E 
Aerospace  E  E  
Shipbuilding    P P 
Electric equipment     
Computer and electronics  P P P P 
Boradband, digital devices, satellites  E E E 
Optoelectronics  E   
Measurmnet instruments       
Other manufacturing industries      
Source: our elaboration on National Five Year Plans  
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Table 2. Pearson coefficient between the SSI variables. 
 



















































































































































Employed persons/Total national employed persons (%) 
(2011) 
1,0000 0,7566 0,6544 0,7389 0,7471 
Gross industrial output Growth (2007 - 2011) 0,7566 1,0000 0,9620 0,7897 0,8203 
Fixed assets Growth (2007 - 2011) 0,6544 0,9620 1,0000 0,6524 0,6786 
Total profits Growth (2007 - 2011) 0,7389 0,7897 0,6524 1,0000 0,8689 
Value added tax payable Growth (2007- 2011) 0,7471 0,8203 0,6786 0,8689 1,0000 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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